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CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY PANEL
ABI COMMISSION’S REPORT ON THE REFORM OF
CHAPTER 11: SMALL AND MEDIUM BUSINESSES, SALES OF
ASSETS, FINANCING, AND PLANS
Michelle M. Harner (Moderator)∗
G. Eric Brunstad, Jr.∗∗
The Honorable Wendy L. Hagenau∗∗∗
Melissa B. Jacoby∗∗∗∗
MS. DEPPERT: Good morning, everyone. My name is Chelsea Deppert, and
as this year’s Executive Symposium Editor, I’d like to welcome all of you to
the Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal’s (the “EBDJ”) Thirteenth
Annual Symposium.
Before we begin, I want to take a moment and thank those who have been
invaluable to the Journal’s ongoing success. First, thank you to Dean James
Elliott, Professor Charles Shanor, our alumni advisor Keith Shapiro, and our
advisory board for their ongoing support. Of course, a very special thanks goes
out to Professor Pardo who generously donates his time mentoring our student
authors and providing his expertise to the Journal.
I’d also like to extend my gratitude to those who helped make today
happen. Thank you to Emory’s Marketing and Communications team, the
Creditors’ Rights Section of the Georgia Bar, for their assistance in publicizing
this event.
I’d also like to express my appreciation to the EBDJ staff members, the
EBDJ’s Editor-in-Chief, Armstead Lewis, and the Assistant Symposium
Editor, Katherine Stuart, for their ongoing support throughout the entire
planning process. Finally, thank you to Dean Robert Schapiro, Vice Dean
Ahdieh, and everyone else who has helped the Journal over the years.
At this time, I’d like to invite Dean Ahdieh to the stage to say a few words.
∗ Professor of Law and Director of the Business Law Program, University of Maryland School of Law
and Reporter for the ABI Commission’s Study.
∗∗ Partner at Dechert LLP and Adjunct Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center.
∗∗∗ Distinguished U. S. Bankruptcy Judge for the Northern District of Georgia.
∗∗∗∗ Graham Kenan Professor of Law, University of North Carolina School of Law.
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DEAN AHDIEH: Let me join Chelsea in welcoming you all this morning on
behalf of the entire faculty as well as Dean Schapiro. If not for the fact that he
is out of town on the road, he would be here welcoming you himself. I do want
to thank you and welcome you on his behalf.
I also want to thank again a number of the folks that Chelsea already
mentioned. The sponsors of the Symposium, we want to thank for their support
to the Board of Advisors including a number of the folks that Chelsea
mentioned, Dean Elliott, Professor Shanor, and especially Professor Pardo, and
the alumni advisor to the Journal, Keith Shapiro, who has really been a dear
friend to the Journal and also a dear friend to the Law School.
I want to thank the students for making this Symposium possible, and
really for all the great work that the Journal does—particularly to Armie
Lewis, the EBDJ’s Editor-in-Chief, and to Chelsea Deppert, the EBDJ’s
Executive Symposium Editor. Thank you for the work you’ve done.
As I hope is apparent to all of you from the program today and from other
things you already know, Emory Law School considers the Bankruptcy
program here at the Law School to be one of its most special and important
programs, and it considers the Bankruptcy Developments Journal to be really
the crown jewel of that program. We believe it to be the best, and I understand
there can be some controversy over this, but to be the best Law Journal focused
on bankruptcy in the country, and the fact that it is a student-edited journal
makes that an even more special achievement. We also think it’s suggestive of
the distinct focus that Emory Law School has on bridging the value of working
across the lines of theory and practice. We pride ourselves here at Emory on
doing that generally and for bridging that gap between theory and practice
generally. But the Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal may manifest that
success or that focus more than anything else that we do. That’s evident I think
in today’s wonderful program, both the substance of the program as well as the
wonderful panelists that have come together from practice, from the bench, and
from academia. But it’s also more evident more generally in terms of the work
and the engagement that the Journal and its students do in terms of engaging
bench, bar, and academia very effectively. There’s no better way to learn;
there’s no better setting to learn than in that combined atmosphere of theory
and practice, and so I know that all of you will learn a great deal today. We
will have a great morning, and I want to welcome you again, and thank you for
being here.
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MR. LEWIS: Hi, everyone. I’d just like to thank you again for coming. First,
just before we begin, I would just like to take a moment just to thank our
Executive Symposium Editor, Chelsea Deppert, and also Katherine Stuart, the
Assistant Symposium, for all of the effort that they have put in to coordinate
this event, and all the diligent planning that they’ve done. So if you don’t
mind, I’d just like to give them a round of applause for everything.
I probably should introduce myself. I am Armie Lewis, or Armstead Lewis,
and I’m the Editor-in-Chief of the Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal.
Today, I have the pleasure of introducing our Corporate panel. Today’s
Corporate panel will discuss the ABI’s Commission to Study the Reform of
Chapter 11.1 Specifically the panelists will discuss aspects of the report that
deal with asset sales, small and medium businesses, financing and plans.
Before we get going, I would like to just give brief introductions for each of
our panelists.
First, we have Professor Melissa Jacoby. Professor Jacoby graduated with
honors from the University of Pennsylvania Law School. She is the Graham
Kenan Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina School of Law,
where she is also the Robert M. Zinman ABI Resident Scholar for the Spring
of 2016. Professor Jacoby, along with Professor Edward J. Janger,2 wrote the
article that is in your CLE materials, about ice cube bonds, 363 sales and
secured creditor entitlement.3 This is not only a special article because it’s in
your CLE materials, but it’s also an award-winning article that won the
American College of Commercial Finance Lawyers Grant Gilmore Award, and
also won the University of North Carolina School of Law’s Chadbourn Award.
Second, we have Professor G. Eric Brunstad. Professor Brunstad graduated
from the University of Michigan Law School and received his J.S.D and LL.M
from Yale Law School. Professor Brunstad is a partner at Dechert LLP’s,
Connecticut office, where his practice is primarily focused on bankruptcy
appellate work. Professor Brunstad has argued numerous cases in front of the
Supreme Court. I’m not going to list them all for you, but one I think that one
that most of us know is the Stern v. Marshall,4 or the Anna Nicole case for
some of the EBDJ members out there to reference. He is also a widely
1

AM. BANKR. INST. COMM’N TO STUDY THE REFORM OF CHAPTER 11 (2014), https://abiworld.app.
box.com/s/vvircv5xv83aavl4dp4h.
2 David M. Barse Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
3 Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Ice Cube Bonds: Allocating the Price of Process in Chapter 11
Bankruptcy, 123 YALE L.J. 862 (2014).
4 See 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
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published author and is an adjunct professor at Georgetown University’s Law
Center.
Next, we have the Honorable Wendy L. Hagenau. Judge Hagenau
graduated with honors from Duke University Law School. Before taking the
bench, Judge Hagenau was a partner at Bryan, Cave, Powell, Goldstein here in
Atlanta where she was named a Georgia Super Lawyer in 2007, 2008 and
2009. She was also named to the Georgia Legal Elite in 2005, 2006, 2007 and
2008. As many of you know, Judge Hagenau is a distinguished United States
Bankruptcy Judge for the Northern District of Georgia, and importantly, she is
on the advisory board of the Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal. We
very much appreciate everything that Judge Hagenau means to our Journal.
Moderating our panel today is Professor Michelle M. Harner. Professor
Harner is a Professor of Law and Director of the Business Law program at
University of Maryland’s Francis King Carey School of Law where she
teaches numerous Business Law courses which include bankruptcy and
creditors’ rights. Professor Harner was also a Robert M. Zinman ABI resident
scholar for the Fall of 2015. Before becoming a professor, Professor Harner
was a partner at the Chicago office of the international law firm, Jones Day,
where she was part of the business restructuring, insolvency and bankruptcy
group there. Professor Harner has served as the Assistant Reporter for the
Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, and most
relevant to our discussion today, Professor Harner was the Reporter for the
ABI’s Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11.
Now I’m going to get out of the way and turn everything over to Professor
Harner so we can start our panel discussion.
PROFESSOR HARNER: Thank you so much. I want to thank the Journal for
inviting all of us today. This is a really well thought out and interesting
program, and so I look forward not only to this panel’s discussion but the one
to follow.
As Armstead said, we’re here on the corporate panel to talk about the ABI
Commission’s Report which sets forth its findings and recommendations after
studying chapter 11 and potential issues and barriers in the chapter 11 process
for over three years. When I was approached to be the Reporter for the
Commission, I wholeheartedly accepted both the challenge and the opportunity
because I am passionate about our federal bankruptcy system. I’m what they
call a true believer. But I’m a true believer because I believe that an efficient
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and effective bankruptcy system is necessary to keep our economy growing,
our people working, and our markets humming. And so it’s essential that if
there are deficiencies or things we could be doing better, that we really
deliberate and think about those particular items and find a better way forward.
The Commission itself originated from a 2009 ABI program thinking about
chapter 11. As most of you probably know, chapter 11 is the chapter of the
U.S. Bankruptcy Code focused on businesses. Although some individuals can
file for chapter 11 as well, the core focus of chapter 11 is reorganizing business
entities. And, at this 2009 program hosted by the American Bankruptcy
Institute, there was a ground swelling is the only way I can describe it of
concern about whether the Bankruptcy Code had become antiquated, that the
practice and the financial markets had evolved around the Code and the Code
had not kept pace. Indeed, the testimony both at the 2009 program as well as
the testimony at the over 17 public hearings held by the Commission during its
three-year study evidenced that the complexity of the financial markets, the
new financial products offered in the markets, different externalities including
just the way U.S. companies now do business, the growth of outsourcing, the
change from hard tangible assets to more soft, intangible assets, and how we
think about financing and operating those companies simply had outpaced the
Bankruptcy Code.
I may just want to stop for a moment and say don’t get me wrong; the 1978
Bankruptcy Code is a phenomenal piece of legislation. It truly has worked well
for us for over 30 years and it’s proved nimble in a number of ways that I’m
not sure even the authors of the legislation had contemplated. But I think more
and more it’s working because of our fantastically talented bankruptcy bar and
bench. They’re finding ways to make it work, but they’re having to work really
hard to do that.
So, the Commission wanted to figure out a way to make it easier for our
judges and professionals and perhaps most importantly our businesses to use
the federal bankruptcy system. The Commission, as I said, three years of study,
the Commission itself was comprised of 22 of some of the most talented,
experienced and well respected practitioners, judges and academics in the
country. They could not do it alone. They had over 150 members of the
profession on advisory committees that were charged to study in depth
particular areas of chapter 11 practice, and at the end of the day we produced a
400-page report with over 1300 footnotes. So Journal members, just think
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about proofing that document, 1300 footnotes—talking about the chapter 11
practice and how we might do it better collectively.
One more thing, before we jump into the panel discussion because your
three panelists have some really rich insights to offer and I do not want to stand
in their way. But I was surprised as I worked through the process: (1) how
engaged everyone was, regardless of their particular perspectives and client
representations; and (2) how although it wasn’t planned, consistent themes
emerged throughout the three-year study and in the report itself. First, there are
too many barriers to filing chapter 11. Many testified and the evidence showed
the process is too expensive, and for many small businesses it’s too complex,
and we heard testimony that, in my mind, being a student of bankruptcy law,
echoed what we heard prior to the 1978 Code. People were running away from
bankruptcy. They’re doing everything they can right now to stay out of the
federal bankruptcy system. That to me and to the Commission was the first and
foremost sign that we had to do something. If you’re going to have a federal
bankruptcy law, let’s allow people to use it. So the Commission sought first to
reduce barriers.
Second, once you get people into your federal bankruptcy system, the
administration of the system has to be efficient. You can’t let companies file
and die, and too often right now we’re seeing companies file and die or file and
be sold. So the Commission thought long and hard about the administration of
cases, how can we make it more efficient, how can we make it more certain?
We identified I can’t even tell you how many, over 30, circuit and case law
splits on key issues in chapter 11 cases. Business loves certainty. Not knowing
how a court will resolve a key issue in your chapter 11 case is anything but
certainty, and that leads to gamesmanship, strategic plays by parties in the
case, cost and litigation. And I think many of you here could probably attest to
the litigation increase in chapter 11 cases in recent years.
So you reduce barriers, you get them in. Once they’re in, you get them
through quickly, but then you have to help them out. The third thing the
Commission looked at and proposed in its study was refining exit strategies.
How can we make it easier and more workable for companies to either exit
through a traditional plan of reorganization, or as we’re going to talk about
here today, a sale of all or substantially all of the company’s assets.
Finally, the last major theme running throughout the report and throughout
the three years of testimony is if there’s one space where chapter 11 absolutely
does not work, it’s in the small and middle market space. We heard time and
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time and again from businesses, company representatives, creditor
representatives and judges that for small and middle market companies chapter
11 is inefficient, too costly and really a conveyor belt to death for these
companies.
So the Commission thought long and hard about what to do for small and
medium-sized companies, and that’s one of the things we’re going to talk
about today. In fact, there’s a whole section of the report devoted to what the
Commission termed SME’s, small and medium-sized enterprises.5 And I think
we’re going to kick off the panel talking about SME’s. And, Judge, would you
do the honors of perhaps introducing the subject? And just to forewarn you, we
are going to be completely informal and conversational, so if you hear us
interrupting each other, don’t worry. It was planned, we’re not being rude.
JUDGE HAGENAU: Thank you. So, how many of you would guess that
most of the business bankruptcy cases filed in the United States are filed by
small and medium-sized businesses? When you hear about bankruptcy, you
usually hear about the mega-cases, but that’s not the vast majority of what we
deal with on a daily basis.
Why are there so many small and medium-sized bankruptcy cases? Well,
first off, there’s an awful lot of small and medium-sized businesses in the
United States. In 2010, 505,473 new businesses were started, and they
employed 2.5 million people. Professor Harner has an article in one of the ABI
Journals where she cites some SBA statistics that 99.7% of U.S. employer
firms are small and medium-sized enterprises, and over half the working
population works for a small business. So first and foremost, there are just a lot
of small businesses out there. They may be family-owned, they may be
entrepreneurial type ventures and startups, but they’re all different kinds.
But why might they fail more often than large businesses? Well, there’s a
couple of ideas. First is, when a business starts out, it tends to start out small.
So when you have a new idea and your business plan doesn’t work, that’s a
small business failing. So that could be one reason. The other is, small
businesses tend to have a smaller amount of capital. They tend to be more
focused in the area of business. Maybe they’re focused on a particular
geographic area; maybe they’re focused on a particular product or a particular
market. So if something happens in one of those, they don’t have the flexibility

5

See Am. Bankr. Inst. Comm’n to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, supra note 1, at 275–96.
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that a national or international company has to sort of refocus their efforts in
another way.
Small businesses tend to have fewer staff. That means that every day is sort
of a triage of what do we need to deal with? The president of a small business
may be selling one day and fixing the computer the next. So you can’t always
have the luxury of time and money to plan for the eventualities.
The ABI Report states that in 2013 that 74% of the companies that filed
bankruptcy had revenue below $1 million, 74%, and 90% of the filing
companies had 50 or fewer employees. So I asked our clerk’s office to pull
some statistics for the Northern District of Georgia. In 2014 and 2015, these
are chapter 11 statistics, so technically they could include some individuals.
But 60% of our chapter 11’s had assets below $1 million, and 93% had assets
below $10 million. So, certainly here in our district we track the national norm,
and we are very heavily focused on small businesses.
So, how they can reorganize is critical to our country because they employ
a lot of people, but it’s also critical to our bankruptcy system because this is
where we spend most of our time. The small business owners struggle with
using the Bankruptcy Code, as Professor Harner mentioned. Why? Well, small
businesses in my experience tend to be disorganized, stretched thin, have little
capital, have minimal financial records, and rarely have an exit strategy. So
none of those things are very conducive to fitting in to the Bankruptcy Code as
we have it right now, where we are asking people as a practical matter to fill
out forms constantly, generate information, and spend money. So that’s one
deterrent.
The other is that small businesses tend to be closely held, so it’s really
important to the owners/managers of these small businesses know what’s
going to happen to them. This is not like the CEO of Delta saying, how can I
deal with the company regardless of what happens to me. When you’re the sole
proprietor basically of your business or your family business, this is about how
you feed your family. This is about your salary and your kids’ salaries or your
wife’s salary, in addition to the employees that you have.
These small businesses may be a dentist’s office, they may be a hairdresser,
a barber, they may be a flower shop. They may be a small clothing boutique or
giftware. In the Northern District of Georgia we also have a fairly high number
of churches, nondenominational churches that are small businesses. So they
come in all shapes and sizes, but they look a lot different from Delta. The
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proprietors of these businesses want to make sure they end up owning the
business at the other end; that’s their goal.
And then here’s another problem. So the Bankruptcy Code is very much
built on formality. If you’ve ever represented a small business, how many
times have you actually seen board minutes, shareholder meetings, stock
certificates. When a sole proprietor puts money in to make payroll, is there a
note? Is there a loan agreement? How’s it documented? It’s not. So when they
get in bankruptcy, all these things trip them up. All of these good intentioned
measures that they took trip them up in the form of preferences, fraudulent
conveyances, recharacterization of their loan to equity, that sort of thing.
So because of these issues, because of the expense and the inflexibility,
many of them are choosing other avenues for their reorganization such as state
court receiverships or assignments for the benefit of creditors.
So, the Bankruptcy Code has had a small business section for quite a while.
What it provides right now is for a person, which notably includes individuals
who have noncontingent, liquidated debt of $2,490,925.00 or less. That’s your
small business debtor. So roughly $2.5 million of noncontingent, liquidated
debt. It excludes a person whose primary business activity is owning or
operating real estate, and there’s no committee appointed under the present
scheme for the small business. But the SME, as the ABI has drafted it, is a
little bit different. Here, the Commission does not anticipate that individuals
would be part of the small business structure. A SME would be any business
with $10 million or less in assets or liabilities. So think about that for just a
minute. It’s $10 million as opposed to $2.5 million. It’s assets or liabilities, not
just liabilities, and it’s all liabilities, not just liquidated, noncontingent
liabilities. So, there are some different standards for what makes an SME under
the ABI recommendations.
PROFESSOR HARNER: And, Judge, if I can just interrupt you there, I’d be
interested on your perspective. So, when the Commission was crafting that
definition, I know we want to talk about whether that dollar amount is the right
bucket to be thinking about. They heard testimony that under the current
system that you described so well, there’s often a lot of unnecessary
uncertainty or litigation about the liability calculation because of the variation
that’s in the Code as you’re thinking about that threshold. Do you see a lot of
litigation on that issue? Or how in practicality do small businesses handle that
calculation?
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JUDGE HAGENAU: In my experience, the number is so small, $2.5 million,
that we don’t have a lot of litigation over whether you’ve met it or not. Most of
the companies that fit this $2.5 million truly are largely sole proprietors. It
really is the doctor, the dentist, the hairdresser, the shop owner, and there’s not
a lot of question about the contingent, unliquidated.
PROFESSOR HARNER: And do those, when we’re talking about the sole
proprietors, you can have a true sole proprietor where it’s a person doing
business without an entity in front of it, so not a corporation, not an LLC or
some type of limited liability structure to work from. Some would say that
those are just really big chapter 13 cases. Are they just really big chapter 13
cases?
JUDGE HAGENAU: In many instances they are approached by the debtor
and by counsel as a large chapter 13, because they frequently start by an
individual going to a chapter 13 lawyer and saying, here’s my problem. And
then the lawyer realizes, oh, well, you’re not really a sole proprietor; you have
this separate business and you really have more to deal with than we can deal
with in a chapter 13. But they’re really moving together because if the
company has debt, more than likely the individual has guaranteed the debt, so
they’re running the same paths.
PROFESSOR HARNER: And that’s so helpful. So I’m going to let you
continue because you’re doing a terrific overview. I just wanted to highlight
that I think there’s a misperception that small cases mean simple, easy cases.
JUDGE HAGENAU: That’s not true.
PROFESSOR HARNER: I don’t think that’s true at all. So as we’re thinking
about where to draw lines and the appropriate structures, the Commission
struggled with it, and I think as a profession we need to struggle with it as well.
JUDGE HAGENAU: One additional piece of the ABI’s recommendation for
an SME is that a company with assets or liabilities between $10 and $50
million could opt to be treated as an SME, so you can have a company with
$50 million of assets or $50 million of liabilities that can opt to be treated as a
small business. That would be subject to objection by the U.S. Trustee or by a
party in interest.
Now, one of the other areas that the ABI recommended change to that I
think we will all be applauding is getting rid of the deadlines for small
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businesses.6 Right now the Code requires that a plan be filed within 300 days,
and that a plan be confirmed within 45 days of when it’s filed. And most of us
would agree these deadlines are difficult to meet and difficult to apply. Issues
such as what if I amend the plan outside the 300 days? What if I want to file a
second plan but it’s outside the 300 days? What if I need to continue the
confirmation hearing? And I think most of us on the bench side have come up
with solutions, but it seems artificial to make people fit within this guideline.
So the ABI recommends that the debtor have the same exclusivity period in an
SME that they do with regular chapter 11 cases, 120 days, and that at the outset
you have something that I think is akin to a Rule 26 conference. Basically, you
sit down with the judge and you figure out what the scope is going to be of the
chapter 11 and what deadlines will be set in terms of when a plan should be
filed.
One of the other provisions of the ABI’s recommendations I think is really
interesting is they recommend getting rid of the examiner and using instead an
estate neutral. The estate neutral would be appointed by the court and then the
neutral’s duties, the scope of their duties and how long they serve is really just
determined by the court. And with respect to the small business area, you could
see how that could be really helpful, because the court could appoint somebody
with some financial acumen if they felt like that’s what a small business debtor
needed. They could appoint someone who’s more lawyerly and really define
what it is that you want that estate neutral to do.
PROFESSOR BRUNSTAD: So, Judge, some people would ask the question,
is it really worth saving these small businesses? And what I’m hearing you say
so far is that, yes, it is. We live in a society in which small businesses are
responsible for most of our job growth. Small businesses are huge employers
in the economy. But it’s kind of frightening. How many of you have ever
wanted to start your own small business? Maybe a restaurant or something like
that. Raise your hand. Most people sort of have that dream at least somewhere
in the back of their mind.
PROFESSOR JACOBY: Not necessarily in law school.
PROFESSOR BRUNSTAD: Not necessarily in law school, but in business
school that’s for sure. But yet most small businesses, more than half of them
fail within five years, so it’s a big problem. But what do we do? There’s this
neutral idea, but what about the problems that many small businesses actually
6

Id. at 294–96.
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face that can seem to be kind of intractable? So many small businesses are
started by people who come into the business really unaware of what they’re
getting into. They’re very optimistic, they have an idea, but they run into all
kinds of problems: inventory management problems, growth management
problems, labor management problems, product issues, customer service
issues, overhead problems, unfamiliarity with financing terms, all of those
kinds of things, competitive problems, they don’t understand what they’re
doing when they sign these lease agreements, they don’t know what a franchise
agreement is, all of these kinds of things. Is there some sort of means in which
we can address some of these problems in the context of this estate neutral or
something like that in this process?
JUDGE HAGENAU: Well, I think the idea is that the estate neutral may be
able to assist with some of the education, but I don’t think anyone is expecting
the estate neutral to be—correct me if I’m wrong—to really be representing the
debtor in the sense of giving true legal advice or business advice. It’s really
more of a sounding board and perhaps pointing you in the right direction of
where to get assistance; would that be correct?
PROFESSOR HARNER: I think that’s absolutely correct, and just by way of
background, the estate neutral really serves two different purposes. In the
Report, there’s the broad concept of the estate neutral that the Commission felt
should replace an examiner because although examiners can provide value in
certain kinds of cases, it’s a very limited role. Presently some of the triggers
for the examiner, the mandatory appointment trigger, most commissioners felt
wasn’t serving a meaningful purpose, and they felt judges were having to try to
work around the limitations in thinking about the needs of the particular case.
So on whole, the Commission was trying to make the role of an estate neutral
more flexible so that judges absolutely could help a particular debtor. And then
when you thought about the estate neutral in the small business context, I think
in general the Commission felt we were trying to make small businesses
pigeonhole themselves into what Congress thought a small business chapter
should look like. And what the Commission really wanted to do rather than let
a small business debtor come in and have the Court and the parties build a
chapter that would work for them. And there I think the estate neutral would
play a vital role so that the judge, and I don’t know if you’ve seen instances
where you could do this, could say, well, this particular business debtor has a
fantastic concept but no idea how to put together a viable business plan. Let’s
find a turnaround expert that can come in and assist with the business plan and
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some of the financing challenges it’s facing. So, again, not advising but really
helping them from a strategic standpoint fix one of the obstacles in their case.
PROFESSOR JACOBY: Could I jump in and ask a question to the Judge or
Professor Harner? I have two questions about the estate neutral. One, is that
even though there seems to be general agreement that this would be a
beneficial addition to the 99% or 95% of cases that are SMEs, and yet the
proposal isn’t to make them mandatory, I think, in these cases; it is to make it a
possibility, which strikes me as perhaps raising a litigation point and some
costs associated with that. So I’d be interested in responses, reactions to that.
The second thing, what it really means to be an estate neutral versus a
chapter 12 Trustee versus an examiner. We’re asking a lot of many of these
roles, and they don’t hang together in theory all that well. They’re sort of a
mixture of things we would like these parties to do. So I struggle with, even if
there does need to be some new governance structure, because we can’t rely on
what the 1978 Code sort of expected about a creditors’ committee and not a
huge lien on everything, I’m a little bit left struggling with how to cabin what
the responsibilities are.
PROFESSOR HARNER: I’ll take a quick crack and then would welcome
additional insight. So first, on terms of whether it’s mandatory or not, the
Commission actually debated whether it should be a mandatory appointment of
an estate neutral if a company, an SME files, because I think there’s where true
utility can be found in the estate neutral role. The concern was twofold: one,
we didn’t want to create a barrier to a small business wanting to file a chapter
11 case. So, in counseling a business I think the Judge rightly pointed out one
question you get is, can I keep my business? Can I keep the equity when I
come out of bankruptcy? The other is, well, who runs my business? And we
didn’t want to create a situation where a mandatory figure in the bankruptcy
system could be perceived as displacing management, because again, we
wanted to encourage filings, not discourage.
As far as the various roles or theories that could underline a concept like
the estate neutral, I think you’re right; it’s exceptionally broad, and I think
that’s where the Commission found beauty in it. But the Commission also was
mindful that at least for many part of the challenge in chapter 11 right now is
the restraint on judicial discretion that has flowed from some of the
amendments to the Code over the years. And, so underlying many of these
concepts as the estate neutral is a suggestion that we need to have judicial
discretion reintroduced into the process because no chapter 11 debtor is similar
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to the next. It’s not a cookie cutter process. You need an informed bankruptcy
judge to help craft a process that works for the company, and so the concept is
the order appointing the estate neutral when warranted would specify the role
and make sure that it was tailored to the particular issues, and one not
mandatory but also not cookie cutter.
JUDGE HAGENAU: And I agree. I think a lot of times the small businesses
come in with really one problem or another. Maybe they’re behind on their
taxes, and so then what really needs to happen is some negotiation with the
IRS or the Department of Revenue. Maybe they have a problem with a secured
lender and really the negotiation just needs to be a restructuring of the debt. In
those cases you might not really need an estate neutral.
But then there are other situations where they would, and getting back to
Professor Brunstad’s original question, I think a lot of folks when they get into
this, I don’t think we do a lot of education in high school or college about how
to run a business unless you happened to have chosen entrepreneurship or
something like that as your major in college. The bankruptcy section of the
Atlanta Bar does a consumer education program in the high schools, which
we’ve just been doing this month. In the high school that I went to, one of the
classes was called a Human Resources class, which I’d never heard of before.
It was relatively small, about ten students, but the teacher said these were all
students who expected to run their own business and that’s why they were
taking that class. They asked the best questions. So I think if you had some
more opportunities like that, because a lot of people that start businesses do it
right out of high school. It doesn’t have to be someone who’s got a masters in
something to go start a business. Education, I think, is a big part of it.
Let me turn before we run out of time to plan confirmation, because that
does remain the goal in a chapter 11 of an SME is to confirm a plan, and there
are a couple of proposals that are different. You will hear from Eric about
proposals that are different across the board to all chapter 11’s, and those I may
just touch on briefly, but I won’t go into any detail.
With respect to the SME, one change is that § 1111(b) no longer would
apply. So that means if you are an undersecured creditor, your claim would be
bifurcated under § 506 and you would not have the option of deeming your
entire claim to be secured.
PROFESSOR JACOBY: That sounds like a very popular proposal to many of
those who read the Report, right?
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JUDGE HAGENAU: Not to the secured lenders.
PROFESSOR HARNER: It’s been a point of discussion.
PROFESSOR JACOBY: That was a joke.
PROFESSOR HARNER: But interesting, that’s really the only place in the
SME context that the secured creditors’ rights are impacted because they’re not
part of the equity retention compromise on the absolute priority rule that was
proposed.
JUDGE HAGENAU: So another change, let’s talk about the absolute priority
rule. Unfortunately, that is staying under the ABI’s recommendations in this
small business area. So you can avoid the absolute priority rule of course by
getting the acceptance of a class. The ABI recommendations stick with the
current Code construct, which requires an affirmative vote to be an acceptance
in a plan.7
Personally, this is an area I would like to see further exploration at least as
to the smallest businesses, and would view it more like a chapter 13 where an
absence of an objection means the class has accepted. And I say that because,
again, in the smallest cases you tend to have one problem or another, but it
rarely is the unsecured creditors. And when you look at who the unsecured
creditors are, it’s amazing how often it’s American Express and Discover. And
it’s hard to get an accepting vote out of American Express, although I think Ed
Danowitz has done it once or twice.8 We had to extend the confirmation
hearing a couple of times to be able to get that vote in. But why are we going
through that if no unsecured creditor cares enough in a small business case to
vote or to object? My personal opinion is, at least in the smallest cases we
should do it more like a chapter 13. But you still have to have the vote. So if
the plan has not been accepted by all the classes, now you have to deal with the
absolute priority rule. The ABI would actually codify the new value exception,
and the exception would be subject to a market test much like the LaSalle
case.9
But there’s another new concept that the ABI has recommended, and it is
called the equity retention plan. The equity retention plan would be another
way that the owners could keep their equity without putting in new value. This
7

See id. at 296–98.
Edward F. Danowitz, Jr. is an attorney in Atlanta, Georgia that has represented business and business
owners with startups, reorganizations, bankruptcies and other related matters.
9 526 U.S. 434, 457–58 (1999).
8
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would look like this. So the equity keeps 100% of the voting interest and 15%
of the economic interest in the business. The unsecured class that did not vote
to accept the plan gets 85% of the economic interest and the right to vote on
certain transactions such as a merger or the sale of virtually all the assets. The
company would pay the net cash flow to the unsecured creditors at least
annually for three years, and in the fourth year the unsecured creditor class
would have to be paid in full without interest, as I understand it, and all of the
cash flow payments you’ve made would be credited towards it, so you’re just
making up the difference in the fourth year. But if you haven’t been able to pay
the creditors in full by year four, then the unsecured creditors get 85% of the
common stock.
So, I understand where this concept is going, but thinking about the small
business cases that I see, most of the time are the smallest, I have a hard time
seeing how this works practically because most of them while I suppose
technically they have stock somewhere, nobody really works with the same
sort of corporate structure. There’s not really priority stock and common stock,
and truthfully there’s not a distribution on your economic interest. If you’re a
small business, the way you get money out of the business is through your
salary most often.
PROFESSOR BRUNSTAD: What would they do with the stock that they
got? They’ve got a stock in small business enterprise—
JUDGE HAGENAU: In the laundry.
PROFESSOR BRUNSTAD: —down the road, in the laundry operator, the
florist shop, the dentist’s office or something like that. The only person or I
guess the most interested person would be the debtor in having that back.
PROFESSOR HARNER: I feel like I have to jump in to explain the purpose
here. So, first I will concede personally as Professor Harner and not speaking
for the Commission, that I do think there are a number of ways we could think
about dividing the buckets with small businesses and perhaps the very smallest
of the small business cases could do something more akin to a chapter 12 type
situation or a chapter 13. But then the only other thing we have is what works
well for the mega cases, and there seems to be this large area in-between the
really, really small business cases and the megas that’s this gray area where the
Bankruptcy Code is not working—they’re not simple corporate structures,
they’re a little bit more complex. So, I think there’s a lot of robust and
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constructive dialogue we could have about how to revamp the small business
and mid-market provisions.
But on the plan specifically, it’s very akin, for those of you who do startup
work, to thinking about a venture investment in a small business company. So
you’re getting a preferred interest basically, and you’re setting your maturity or
redemption time at four years. And so they have the opportunity, the small
business, to repay their creditors which many companies want to do. No one
likes to stiff their creditors, particularly if you need them moving forward. And
here I’m thinking more about the mid-market companies who need those
suppliers and vendors and other small businesses they’re working with. And so
you give them a preferred interest much like you would give a venture in a
startup arrangement that matures at the end of the four years. If you can pay
them off then or sooner, you get the benefit of not having to pay interest on
that investment. That was one of the balances struck. And if you can’t, you’re
then sharing the ownership of the company, but it really gives a small and
particularly a mid-market company a longer period within which to reorganize
so that we’re not really imposing artificial parameters.
So, that’s the concept. Certainly refinements could be made. And just one
other note that I probably should’ve highlighted before we started, the
Commission Report was unanimously accepted by all the Commissioners. It’s
a consensus product, so there are lots of compromises built into the provisions.
And as you’re sitting here in the audience, whether you’re a law student or
you’re a practitioner or you’re a judge or academic, I would like you to think
about ways the proposals we’re discussing can impact and change the practice
day-to-day right now. We would like to see this adopted by Congress at some
point, but we’ve already seen courts adopt particular provisions. I’ve spoken to
practitioners who have found ways to work concepts into their negotiations and
gain a little bit more leverage. So, a lot of what we’re talking about I think can
have immediate impact. But I think the consensus point is important as well
because there are particular bargains that may not be what you would want for
your particular client, but again, it was the nature of the compromise.
PROFESSOR BRUNSTAD: Well, I applaud the creativity. I think this Report
is actually a wonderful piece of work, and I think certainly has a lot of
suggestions that are definite improvements on the current law. But I guess for
consistency, to the extent we’re treating these small businesses like sole
proprietorships, even though they may have a corporate forum, they really are
an extension of the owner typically and the owner’s human capital is really
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bound up in the business. Shouldn’t we be treating the business essentially an
extension of human capital, and just like you can’t take a lien on human capital
and you can’t own human capital and only the individual gets to own his or her
human capital, shouldn’t we treat businesses that way, too, which is again the
chapter 13 model? So that we recognize that the equity ownership in the
business is really analytically no different than the equity ownership in one’s
own human capital, in which case it’s just something you just get to keep.
PROFESSOR HARNER: So, I would venture to say that Professor Jacoby
and I probably agree with you on your conceptualization of human capital and
whether or not you can take an interest in it, we’re aligned there and we both
have spoken extensively about it, but I will tell you there are people who
vehemently disagree with that. And so I think that’s an open issue as to exactly
what a business entity is, what value generation is, and what a secured creditor
is entitled to a lien in, which relates to this plan concept we’re talking about,
what you should make or ask an owner to give up in order to keep the business
entity itself.
PROFESSOR JACOBY: And if one does lean more in favor of Professor
Brunstad’s framework, then we’re in more of a disposable income question
and a proportion of disposable income.
JUDGE HAGENAU: And then it looks more like a chapter 12 or even an
individual chapter 11 where, if someone objects then you have to make sure
that your disposable income is paid over a certain period of time. The other
thing that’s to me nice about the chapter 11 individual concept and chapter 13
concept, chapter 11 individual, is that you wait and see if someone objects. The
problem with using § 1129 on a small business is that you’re going through
this thou shalt not confirm a plan unless, whereas those other frameworks
allow you to confirm a plan, and only if someone objects do you have to get to
some of these more complex issues. I would love to see it go in that direction.
PROFESSOR JACOBY: Even after Espinosa?10
PROFESSOR HARNER: I’m going to keep us moving. Judge, I want to
thank you. That was a fantastic overview and gives us a lot of food for thought.
I think the real takeaway is on the small business space, small middle market
space I should say, I think everyone agrees we need to do something. I think
people generally are in robust agreement that they’re not working for these
types of companies. The question then becomes how we fix the problem, and if
10

See 559 U.S. 260 (2010).
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it’s a one-size-fits-all fix for this group of small middle market companies, or
if we need to think more strategically about the kinds of companies, the people
behind the companies, and how we best serve those objectives.
So, we’ve been talking just now about plans and the way to use a plan of
reorganization as a company’s exit strategy. One of the major shifts I think in
chapter 11 practice, particularly over the past, say, 10 to 15 years, has been a
new exit strategy, one that’s not currently condoned by the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code, and that’s exiting through a sale of all or substantially all of the
company’s assets. The Commission was quite struck by the increase in the
number of cases that conclude through a sale of all or substantially all of the
company’s assets. Now that’s not to say that companies aren’t doing plans.
There certainly are plans still being confirmed. But if you look at the data,
there is a linear trend to increase § 363 sales, which corresponds to a decrease
in the length of chapter 11 cases. Now some would applaud that—they would
say, “yay, that reduces costs, it reduces the time a company is a ‘bankrupt’ in a
chapter 11 case.” But some would also say, “the depression in time has gone
too far.” In fact, the average case, particularly when it’s a sale of all or
substantially all of the company’s assets, is right now between thirty and forty
days. That’s a really quick chapter 11 case. And even in a simple, “simple”
chapter 11 case, I’m not sure how the court, the U.S. Trustee and the creditors
who weren’t party to the negotiations prior to the filing get their head around
the financial situation and the alternatives available to this particular company.
So, the speed with which companies are “reorganizing through sales” is a little
troubling and the Commission thought about it long and hard. And I’m going
to let Professor Jacoby talk about the Commission’s proposals and her thoughts
on sales of all or substantially all of the company’s assets. And again, I just
want to emphasize that the developments in the Commission Report were
based on the empirical data we saw, the testimony we heard, and then also this
new development of structured dismissals. And certainly there’s a lot of
conversation around structured dismissals currently, particularly with the Third
Circuit’s decisions in Jevic11 and ICL12 which seem to embrace the concept in
at least some cases in some respects. So there’s a lot to talk about here, and we
have only a limited amount of time so take it away, Professor Jacoby.
PROFESSOR JACOBY: I agree with Professor Harner.
PROFESSOR HARNER: And Congress should, as well.
11
12

787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed, No. 15-649 (U.S. Nov. 16, 2015).
802 F.3d 547 (3d Cir. 2015).

CORPORATE PANEL GALLEYSPROOFS

286

EMORY BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTS JOURNAL

5/11/2016 10:51 AM

[Vol. 32

PROFESSOR JACOBY: Bankruptcy provides an extraordinary remedy. I
think we all can acknowledge that, even if it performs such an important role in
our economic growth in society, it is providing extensive powers that are just
not available under state law. In the 1978 Code, there was a calibrated balance
and governance structure to insure that a business or an individual, but a
business who got the benefits of bankruptcy was exposed to a deliberate
process with checks and balances, creditor voting, creditor entitlements and
rights to speak up in other ways, and the possibility of operational
restructuring, managerial changes, financial restructuring. And then we have
the problem of what if the business is—ice cube is actually too nice sounding
in a way. Think of it more as a truck of rotting salmon. So the truck of rotting
salmon comes in and people say, we don’t have time for these niceties.
Nobody wants this truck of rotting salmon to sit here. We must act today. Who
could be against that? And that sounds reasonable. Of course we don’t want to
subject a depreciating asset that will not only be worth less tomorrow, but
affirmatively offensive, because of the niceties that the 1978 Code anticipated.
On the other hand, the system isn’t really set up to fully sort those trucks
from all the other businesses and sometimes it is not that hard to turn a
business that otherwise wouldn’t be a depreciating asset into one that is, the
idea of unplugging the freezer or refusing to provide financing. So what we
have now is a situation where fast sales might be benefitting some
stakeholders. But the bankruptcy estate, many of its creditors and other
intended beneficiaries of bankruptcy law such as employees, such as
communities, are potentially suffering in the process. And part of the problem
is that speed obscures the ability to resolve these issues.
Another problem is that sometimes the sale and handing out the money, if
there is any money from it, if it’s not all credit bid, are lumped together, and
that’s further obscuring making sure that assets are allocated in anticipation of
the way that Congress said so in the 1978 Code.
In this way, I think the Commission Report asked all the right questions
that need to be asked about this proliferation of 363 sales that now perhaps
parties feel that they would not be serving their clients if they proposed a
traditional plan in some cases. So we have to move away from that idea.
And so there are a couple of different tools that the Report talks about. One
is a timing point that you’re not supposed to do the sale in the first 60 days
except if you can show extraordinary circumstances—shifting the presumption
somewhat. Now, we already have some of that in the Federal Rules of
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Bankruptcy Procedure, but I think this is seeking to heighten that and shifting
the leverage around that timing.
PROFESSOR HARNER: And if I can just interject here. I think here the
general sense of the Commission was that thing called the automatic stay that
we used to value so highly in bankruptcy cases had disappeared in many.13
And so the 60-day moratorium both in the sale context and the financing
context which go hand in hand, really was an effort to reinstitute the automatic
stay. Let’s give that honest but unfortunate debtor an opportunity to catch its
financial breath. And so that was a huge part of it, as well as to heighten, as
you say, what we already have in the system.
PROFESSOR JACOBY: Again, the goal is making sure that the parties who
were affected have adequate information. That is part of the bankruptcy
bargain. If someone is going to get a Court’s judgment and order, ruling assets
are sold free and clear of a very wide range of claims and interest, that is a very
big deal, and so there is a trade-off to make sure that people have the
information.
Second, there’s a new § 363(x).14 What I see here, and I do agree with this,
is we’re now so far down the path it’s hard to put the genie completely back in
the bottle, that there is a sense that a sale process rather than a sale through a
plan with all the bells and whistles sometimes may well be the best thing to do.
But it adds some of those procedural protections or substantive protections for
creditors that we find in chapter 11 plan process in § 1129.
Now I would say that one might ask, how did you choose the plan
confirmation requirements that you did or that the Commission did because it’s
not all of them? It’s just some of them. I think that it’s not all priority debts get
certain protection but just some of them. So, I would raise some questions
about that. But it seems to me that if you’re going to keep some standalone sale
process that there has to be more robust protections for creditors and other
stakeholders, and so I do think that’s exactly right to go down that path.
Because otherwise we do have a prepackaged bankruptcy possibility already in
the Code, and so if it makes it a little bit harder or by enhancing all creditors
rights to object and be involved in the sale process, maybe that will incentivize
some debtors and creditors who are particularly involved in the case to say,

13
14

See Am. Bankr. Inst. Comm’n to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, supra note 1, at 79.
Id. at 83.
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you know what, let’s just do the regular plan. Maybe we were onto something
there.
PROFESSOR JACOBY: And I was just going to say you highlight some
important points. So you can do a prepackaged plan, but oftentimes we’re not
so concerned about the speed in those scenarios because those who might not
have been at the bargaining table to negotiate the prepackaged plan aren’t
being impaired at least in theory. You typically reinstitute your trade or you
pay them 100%, and where you’re compromising the debt through the plan is
at the secured in recent times or the bondholder level where you have those
parties at the table prior to the filing. And so your emphasis on getting the
information to all the parties who are impacted by the bankruptcy case, even if
they’re going to be wiped out through the process and giving them due process
to understand what the company contemplated and why the end result is best
for the estate is so critical and actually formed the pieces of § 1129 that the
Commission borrowed in the 363(x) context.
PROFESSOR JACOBY: So two more pieces, there are actually other—I
think there’s a lot of connecting pieces in the Commission Report, so that’s
why it’s great to read the whole thing but I’m just going to mention I think two
more categories. A third is something that’s already very well familiar in all
federal court litigation but especially in bankruptcy an administrative claims
reserve. It is essential to separate the question of whether you need a fast sale
and whether the money has to be handed out yesterday or at latest today. We
need time sometimes to sort out entitlements and in particular this is debated at
length in the ice cube bonds paper that’s in your materials, to make sure that
especially when we’re dealing with secured claimants, but also with unsecured,
that what is being claimed actually is supported by applicable, non-bankruptcy
law.15 That includes the scope of the security interest, whether it was properly
perfected, and whether applicable state law would recognize the boundaries of
the security interest that’s being claimed. And so, sure, we need to sell the
truck of salmon today, but we don’t necessarily need to hand out the money
today. We need to have time to sort that out.
Fourth piece I would mention does relate back to structured dismissals. The
idea of yet another exit out of bankruptcy where, at least in the Third Circuit,
even over the objection of priority creditors with WARN Act claims or could
be any priority creditor, that it’s possible to confirm or order a dismissal order
that allocates settlement money basically in a way that does not comport with
15

See Jacoby & Janger, supra note 3.
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the priorities in the Bankruptcy Code, whether in § 507, whether in the
absolute priority rule in § 1129, or more generally given the origins of the
absolute priority rule, the Commission Report says it is not necessary to have a
structured dismissal option. Professor Harner will correct me if I don’t have
that exactly right, if there was a caveat there. And I fully agree with that, that
conclusion, there is the Jevic decision, there has been a cert petition filed, there
is an amicus brief by academics that I was part of supporting the Supreme
Court taking that.16 I don’t think we know yet, but I think that is an important
piece to respecting creditor entitlements, and that in certain ways if Congress
says that certain groups should not be priority creditors anymore, okay. But
until then, if you want some of these benefits of bankruptcy, you’ve got to take
the package.
PROFESSOR BRUNSTAD: Let me ask you this question in sort of
unpacking all of these proposals and looking at it from a little bit higher
altitude. What is it that we are doing chapter 11 reorganization for? We seem
to have these very competing perspectives, and to a large extent as was
explained earlier, this Report represents a compromise, but let’s just step back
for a second. What are we doing? What is this for? On the one hand, we have
the idea, call it the pro-creditor idea, that bankruptcy reorganization is about
getting the claims paid and it’s about respecting the entitlements of the parties.
Certainly there is that aspect to bankruptcy. You can’t deny it. But this seems
to be like a focus especially on the rights of secured parties. Secured parties
have these property interests in the assets; therefore, certain things follow from
that. So that’s one idea. A second idea, which is in tension with that, of course,
is no, what we’re really here to do is we’re here to salvage this viable business.
We’re here to try to make sure that this business survives and goes on, that the
jobs are saved, the assets are used in this productive way. After all it’s very
hard to put these businesses together. It’s very hard to put together all the
capital, the human capital, the physical assets and things like that to create
these things. Businesses fail at alarmingly high rates. If we can save them,
that’s great. That’s what we’re really here for. Or, is it a combination of the
two, recognizing that they conflict? Which do we think is more important
between the two? Because if we think that saving the business is really our
focus, then shouldn’t we be focused on the chapter 11 process as a problemsolving process? We’re going to solve the problems of what to do with the
labor, what to do with the assets. The grand bargaining theory, we’re going to
bring everybody in to sit at the table and negotiate the resolution and come up
16

787 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 2015), petition for cert. filed, No. 15-649 (U.S. Nov. 16, 2015).
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with, which of course is going to take time. It’s the anti-speed idea. So which
is it? And where should we draw the line? And depending on how we draw the
line, how does that affect our view of these proposals?
PROFESSOR JACOBY: Well, I think this is an especially good time to ask
those questions, not only because we need to rethink or debate how chapter 11
is working, but at a time when we’re seeing governmental units struggling with
their own financial distress and reaching for a bankruptcy solution for
themselves. And then I might ask back, is there a different theory of
bankruptcy for a municipality or indeed a commonwealth such as Puerto Rico
than there would be for a private entity? And do we have a spectrum of entities
from purely private, which still have public spillover effects, to a true
governmental unit, and how we deal with that. So I’ve broadened, as if the
question could be broadened, I have tried to do that, and that is a great time to
ask Professor Harner about the theory of what bankruptcy is for that you all
were going for.
PROFESSOR HARNER: I think that’s the million dollar question that has
plagued bankruptcy scholars for eons. This is not a new question and I would
give you what I tell my students is the lawyer’s answer: It depends really here
who you ask. And I think when the Commission thought about this issue
because it did, the first thing it did as a body was step back and say, let’s think
about policy and why we’re doing what we’re doing, and I think they chose the
middle road or, Professor Brunstad, what you described as that let’s try to
serve both purposes, let’s try to reorganize companies while still respecting
state entitlements and trying to maximize value for creditors. That’s the dual
purposes of the ‘78 Code we hear referenced all the time. Because it was trying
to balance those competing policy concerns, you see some of the compromises
struck in the Report that we’ve already discussed and some we won’t get to
today. I think on balance there was a preference for saving businesses where
there was a direct conflict, but being mindful that you do have the state law
entitlement and maximization of value principle at play. That being said, as we
think about reform moving forward, I think the policy question drives the
legislation. And in an environment where we’re trying to figure out how to
save jobs, where we’re trying to figure out how to grow our economy, how to
compete with other countries who seem to be doing entrepreneurism much
better than we do, it may be time to rethink the policy question and what
Congress sees as an efficient and effective bankruptcy system because I think
if you answer the question it’s primarily to save jobs and reorganize
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companies, you get a much different reform package than if you compromise
or you go the other way.
JUDGE HAGENAU: Professor Harner, I would wonder if the change in
financing over the last 30 years doesn’t point us more in the direction towards
reorganizing the company in either event, because in the ‘70s the lending was
much more focused on lending on receivables and lending on equipment on
lending on inventory. Now with these purported blanket liens, it is difficult for
a lender to even get repaid without the company either being sold or
reorganized. In other words, unless you just really think that the hard assets are
the best you can do, a regular state court foreclosure doesn’t work for an
operating entity. So that to me suggests that the survival of the business is
where we’re headed, both for the benefit of the creditor as well as the
employees, the community, etc.
PROFESSOR BRUNSTAD: What really resonates with me, to sort of put it
in a theoretical perspective, paying the claims is always just a wealth transfer.
You’re taking money out of one bucket, putting it into another. It’s a wealth
transfer. Saving the actual business so that it can go on and continue to produce
a profit and employ people is a wealth enhancement. It actually makes us
better off.
Now, of course you can’t completely disregard the payment of the claims
because of all the ex-ante effects that would have. You can’t do that, but as
between the two, if you think that what we really want to do here is maximize
our overall social utility, not just some individual’s benefit in a particular case,
then you’ll want to salvage these businesses because it really matters.
PROFESSOR HARNER: I’m sorry. I don’t mean to interrupt. The only thing
I want to push back on and why I think the Commission felt this was such a
complex issue is it’s one thing to say we’re maximizing the value of the
enterprise for societal value. It’s a different thing to say we’re saving the
business which serves the goal of maximizing the value for the creditor so that
the two policies can align at some point. Because I think in large part it
depends who that creditor is. So if your creditor with the blanket lien is a
hedge fund or a private fund that’s been introduced into the secured financing
at a late stage as “rescue financing,” its objective may not be to maximize the
value of the entity for societal utility. It may have a very different agenda.
PROFESSOR BRUNSTAD: Oh, yeah.
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PROFESSOR HARNER: So, I think the policy concerns have been
complicated by not only the evolution in financial markets and the blanket lien
and the complexity of derivatives, but also who’s trading in the claims and
holding the debt at the point we’re asking the question.
PROFESSOR JACOBY: And one more thing while we’re looking at the big
picture here, and I think this will segue into our next topic anyway. We have to
remember that we are in a government with strong states’ rights, limited
federal powers. We do have a bankruptcy clause. The scope of the bankruptcy
clause I think probably can still be debated, but the question of what the goals
of bankruptcy are, I think they do dovetail because it seems like it would be
more than protection of creditors’ rights, which is a very important issue and
does provide some baseline. But that is often, at least the beginning of that is
state law. And so when bankruptcy does allow a firm to be worth more alive
than dead, that is a premium that the federal bankruptcy system has allowed to
be developed. And it’s not clear that belongs to any one certain group of
creditors or not. It is part of that company that may be up for play, but whether
certain kinds of creditors with security interests can claim that, if you take that
theory, then that becomes more complicated. It doesn’t belong to them.
PROFESSOR HARNER: So should we maybe at this point transition to what
might belong to the secured parties and think about financing? Because I think
we have just enough time to do that. But before I do so, I feel like we
distracted the conversation of sales to policy. Is there anything you would want
to add to the § 363(x) provisions and permitting a sale of all or substantially all
of the assets in certain contexts as opposed to the Wild West which it is now?
PROFESSOR JACOBY: Well, I don’t want to belabor this, because I think
the financing issue and the sale issue go hand in hand. So I think we’ve teed up
the right kind of questions. I do want to emphasize that claims reserve is
something that can absolutely be done today. It does not require legislation in
the way that some of the other proposals do, so I fully endorse this concept that
bankruptcy reform happen through all different channels and not just through
statutory reform. Everything everyone’s talked about on this panel shows that,
that we have a Code written under very different times, but we have quite a
distinct system today than in ‘78. But I do think that the financing piece is so
tied into 363 sales that that is where I think it does make sense to go next.
PROFESSOR BRUNSTAD: So we’ve seen an evolution. We’ve seen an
evolution in bankruptcy practice over the last 30 years, and in part that
evolution has been driven by changes in finance. As Judge explained, we had a
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situation historically where you’d have different lenders taking different liens
on different things, but you didn’t necessarily have all the assets liened up
when the debtor went into bankruptcy.
Now we have a situation in which it’s much more common for the
ubiquitous blanket lien. A group of lenders may well have a lien on all the
debtor’s assets, at least the hard assets. There are of course some things you
can’t take a lien on, and that becomes an issue. But the blanket lien idea
typically will give the secured lenders a lot of rights, a lot of rights under state
law, and under our bankruptcy system, as traditionally conceived, a lot of
potential leverage. And that has generated some abuses or some perceived
abuses and some perceived problems, and includes such things as oftentimes
you’ll see very complicated capital structures with the senior secured lenders
on top with intercreditor agreements that will do things like have covenants
that say the junior creditors cannot without the senior secured creditors’
consent provide DIP financing to the debtor entity. And this is an effort and
attempt to gain control not only of the collateral but also subsequently of the
bankruptcy process if there is one. And of course secured lenders are very
acutely aware of and concerned about bankruptcy. After all, that’s arguably
one of the reasons why they took a security interest. If a debtor becomes
insolvent, that’s when their security interests become the most valuable. It’s
how they get preferred payment when otherwise they may not have been paid
very much, and they rely on that, and they want to maximize their rights as
secured lenders. They’re smart, they’re savvy, and so they increasingly over
the years have figured out ways to try to translate that leverage into potentially
control of the reorganization process. In a lot of ways, it has worked.
So the Commission, and again I applaud their efforts in trying to come up
with some responses to this in the areas of financing and adequate protection,
and they’ve done a lot I think of really good work. I want to summarize some
of their recommendations, but I also want to ask a few questions.
First, in the concept of adequate protection, what should we do there? The
problem is that if you say that a secured creditor is entitled to adequate
protection at the fair market value or the reorganization value of the business,
that’s a very high value. What that might mean is that they end up getting a lot
of value with respect to the assets. They may soak up all of the assets, and
what that also means is that there may be no ability to provide them with
adequate protection if in fact basically you’re in a situation where you need
their consent, especially if the secured lender has a lien on all the cash, all the
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cash collateral. There’s no head room for any subsequent financing or things
like that. That gives the secured creditor a lot of leverage.
So the Commission has proposed kind of a compromise. On the one hand
in bankruptcy, we want to respect the rights of the secured party, that at the end
of the day what they should get is the reorganization value when we’re talking
about distribution of value at some point, and we’re talking about
determination of their claims. But for adequate protection purposes, we want to
peg the value of their collateral at foreclosure value. That’s what we want to
respect, foreclosure value. That’s the determining factor. So now what the idea
would be, this would give the debtor more flexibility. When the secured
creditor comes in, we peg the value at foreclosure value. To the extent there’s
excess value there, that can be used to help facilitate the reorganization process
and takes away some of the control that the secured party might have.
There are also things like you can’t do cross-collateralization, one of the
recommendations, anymore, except to provide adequate protection. To the
extent adequate protection proves to be inadequate, then you can have crosscollateralization. This idea that you can lien up prepetition debt with postpetition collateral, that’s not going to be allowed. And so we have these
various reforms.
So the question is, why this idea of giving the secured party reorganization
value, what exactly does that mean? So I would suggest that, well, if the
secured party is going to finance the reorganization, is actually going to put
substantial new money into the enterprise to allow it to reorganize, then I think
it makes sense to give them reorganization value because they’re actually
paying for it in a way, they’re actually contributing to the reorganization. But if
they’re not going to do that, if they’re just going to simply rely on the value of
their claim, which arguably the debtor is trying to enhance the value of that
through the reorganization process not only for the benefit of the secured party
but for all the stakeholders, they should be stuck with foreclosure value for
every purpose. So that’s sort of one critique I throw out there. But obviously
again, I recognize this is a compromise trying to get flexibility while trying to
respect the rights of the secured parties, and I applaud that. But I sort of throw
that one out, that idea out.
PROFESSOR HARNER: Can I just jump in real quick? I agree with the
critique you raise, and it’s an issue I think everyone needs to think about, but I
just wanted to give everyone a point of reference. So I think the easiest way to
conceptualize the concern Professor Brunstad voices is to think about the
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blanket lien, and that really did not emerge in our system until the Uniform
Commercial Codes were changed at the state level. And so you had a situation
where the UCC’s were changed at the state level to permit the blanket lien,
taking a lien in all of the debtor’s assets as opposed to just the equipment or
just the inventory or just the plant. And as a result, what the testimony before
the Commission stated, and we could disagree about the testimony, is that
lending practices changed so that in evaluating the cost of the credit and the
extension of the credit to the debtor, calculations were done on total enterprise
value (“TEV”) because the liens according to the secured creditors are valid
with respect to the profits generated from the assets which is the TEV. And so
that’s where the concept of reorganization value came in, and it is a
compromise. In fact, the Report, we tried to as artfully as we could be very
forthcoming about the compromise reached between using foreclosure value
and reorganization value. But that’s the tension we’re seeing with the fact that
the Code really hasn’t kept up with changes in markets and in state law
because there is this now almost direct conflict between what was originally
contemplated for secured creditor entitlements under the Bankruptcy Code and
how those entitlements now are playing out under state law.
The other thing I think is interesting, you raised the leverage point,
Professor Brunstad, and I think many believe that the foreclosure value
standard, at least in the front end, probably many would welcome it on the
back end as well, but on the front end would maybe reintroduce priming liens
which you rarely see anymore. When’s the last time you saw a debtor come in
and prime the prepetition lenders with a priming debt? So that would be part of
the leverage shift as well.
PROFESSOR JACOBY: Can I ask a question about the adequate protection
proposal which does seem, again, back to state law, I feel like that does reflect
state law entitlement. Yes, it’s cheap and relatively easy to claim a security
interest in lots of personal property under Article 9. Then the real property,
there are some categories that aren’t in there and some things that are not
always property under state law, so I’m not sure they can capture all of those
pieces in an Article 9. Even commercially reasonable disposition I don’t see
them getting all of those pieces. But did you see that as a firm departure from
current law, the foreclosure value proposal?
PROFESSOR HARNER: So first, I agree with Professor Jacoby on the scope
of state law and I think it’s an open issue, and so part of it was setting a bargain
forcing default rule where parties could then negotiate the resolution of that
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state law issue and the conflict with the Bankruptcy Code. The foreclosure
value concept was meant to be different. So currently under adequate
protection litigation, you have three standards adopted by the courts. They’ll
use straight liquidation value, they’ll use going concern or reorganization
value, and then they’ll use this thing that the courts have called in the past
foreclosure value. And usually that’s meant to contemplate the state law rights
of the creditors and what they could recover under state law.
If you read the Report, the Commission tried to nuance the foreclosure
value concept because again, in full honesty, we were very respectful of the
state law rights, and the preference for state law entitlements even under our
federal bankruptcy scheme. And so foreclosure value as used in the
Commission’s Report is meant to reflect what the creditor could actually
receive in a commercially reasonable sale under state law, taking into account
that although we always think you can only sell an asset in one state and you
can never do a true going concern sale under state law, I will tell you there are
true going concern sales happening under state law, and so the creditor could
show the ability to stack the foreclosures in order to get the TEV. In theory, the
foreclosure value may not look much different than reorganization value, but
again it was meant to set a bargain forcing default rule and hopefully create
value for the estate.
PROFESSOR BRUNSTAD: The next area of recommendations is with
debtor-in-possession financing. I think there are some very creative and
excellent proposals here. Some of them fall under the heading, if you prohibit
it outright in the Code, then creditors won’t ask for these things anymore. If
you don’t prohibit it, they’re always going to try to ask for it. And these fall
into the category of cross-collateralization. Cross-collateralization is very
controversial. That’s where—
PROFESSOR JACOBY: Especially in the Eleventh Circuit.
PROFESSOR BRUNSTAD: Especially in the Eleventh Circuit where it’s
prohibited after Saybrook.17 And Saybrook is actually a good illustration.
There the secured creditor had a $24 million deficiency, $34 million in debt,
only $10 million in collateral, $24 million in unsecured debt. And the creditor
said I’ll give you $3 million, Debtor-in-Possession, if you give me a lien
covering all the rest of my claims. So went from being a $24 million deficiency
to potentially being fully secured to the tune of $34 million. And the unsecured
17

See 963 F.2d 1490 (11th Cir. 1992).
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creditors went nuts. This is just an asset grab, they say. This was not a
legitimate financing. They’re not giving something that’s going to help us all.
And so the proposal is just to prohibit cross-collateralization except, as I
mentioned, for adequate protection. No roll-ups and no pay-downs. You can’t
roll-up the prepetition debt into the postpetition facility to essentially
accomplish cross-collateralization that way. And no pay-downs except using
basically postpetition financing to pay off prepetition debt, except where
you’re paying off unaffiliated debt, debt that’s unaffiliated with the
postpetition lender, or if you’re paying off affiliated debt where the secured
postpetition lender typically is providing substantial new money and it’s on
terms that are more favorable than otherwise would be available.
So the idea here, and I think it’s an excellent one, is we want to prohibit
some of these abuses or these perceived abuses that seem to be giving too
much leverage and giving away the candy store potentially, and these asset
grab situations, but we want to maintain flexibility. Then they also propose no
liens on avoidance actions; we’re going to keep those recoveries lien-free. And
you can have what’s called permissible extraordinary financing provisions like
benchmark provisions and things like this, performance provisions, but you
have to take care within the first 60 days that you’re not basically going to
impose these things and put these artificially short deadlines on debtors within
that 60-day breathing spell. Again, I think this is an excellent idea.18
And there’s also this override of what we see in these inter-creditor
agreements, an override where these inter-creditor agreements that say junior
lenders, subordinated junior lenders can’t provide DIP financing without the
consent of the seniors, which of course they don’t give. So this would be a
provision that says, no, we’re going to override that, those are unenforceable.
The juniors can provide DIP financing, provided they aren’t trying to prime the
senior liens and provided that the senior lenders have an option to come in on
at least the same terms and provide the financing themselves. And this of
course is designed to increase flexibility and level the playing field some more
so that we have a system that actually I think is more designed towards
facilitating reorganization, and it dovetails with the provisions on sales.
There are also some provisions you can’t waive, the § 506(c) surcharge, but
then again the idea the surcharge should only apply to prepetition debt. And
you can’t waive the § 552 equities of the case provision, which I also thought
was a beneficial thing. We don’t have time to go into all the details of these
18

See Am. Bankr. Inst. Comm’n to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, supra note 1, at 67–73.
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things. But these it struck me are some really valuable, good reforms. Again,
they kind of fall under the heading, if you prohibit some of these things then
creditors won’t ask for them, and we can focus on other things like the
financing terms and terms that actually could help reorganize the debtor and
don’t sort of give us this cause for concern that what really is trying to go on
here is the problem that seemed evident in Saybrook where the secured creditor
seemed like, by putting in a little money was just going to walk away with all
of the assets.
I think we have a little time left. I just wanted to mention some of the plan
reorganization issues, two of them, unless others want to comment on what I
just said.
PROFESSOR HARNER: Well, I just wanted to ask the Judge a question. I
think part of the objective in the financing, and actually many of the
recommendations but particularly financing was again finding a way to respect
state law entitlements as we’re mandated to do in the federal bankruptcy
system, but reinstilling some voice, some leverage for the debtor which seems
to be missing. From your experience, is that an accurate perception? Has there
been a shift in balance to where the debtor really has no leverage in these
discussions? And is that appropriate or inappropriate? Where should the
balance lie when we’re thinking about the playing field that Professor Brunstad
mentioned?
JUDGE HAGENAU: I do think the debtor has minimal leverage. That’s why
in a case that supports it, a creditors committee is important because they’re
the ones that actually come in and argue don’t give the waiver, don’t give up
the avoidance actions, don’t give up this, don’t give up that, because the debtor
is typically in a position where only one entity is offering the postpetition
financing, and the creditor or the buyer, whoever it is that’s offering the money
always says it’s this or nothing. The debtor doesn’t want the nothing, so
they’re kind of between a rock and a hard place. And so I think this really
gives the debtor additional leverage, and it addresses most of the points that a
committee objects to at the outset, and I think buys some time for everybody to
sort of settle into the case, see what’s going on and what actually makes sense.
PROFESSOR HARNER: That’s very helpful, and I’m glad you brought up
the committee. So, there was a strong push among some at the hearings to
eliminate the use of creditors committee, but as the Judge just articulated, the
Commission found huge value in the role they can serve, provided they have
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the time to get the information and raise the objections and support the debtor
or at least the other constituents.
PROFESSOR JACOBY: I think abolishing the creditors committee concept,
which I have also heard people raise outside of your Commission process, is
premised on the assumption that we’re in a static sort of almost permanent
state of capital structures and how money is going to be invested and loaned in
the future. I don’t know that we should make that assumption at all.
PROFESSOR HARNER: I’m getting the sign from Ms. Deppert over here, so
I don’t think we’re going to have time to run through the plan unless you want
to tick them off very quickly. You’re very efficient, so go ahead.
PROFESSOR BRUNSTAD: I would just say the new value corollary would
be codified, someone who gives new money or money’s worth, reasonably
proportionate to the interest retained, subject to the a market test when the
equity does this, they can keep their equity. And then on cramdown interest
rates, the idea is to reject the prime plus, the formula approach, and to go with
either a market rate in chapter 11 if it’s available or basically an approximation
of the market rate if a market rate isn’t available under the circumstances,
rejecting the bankruptcy court’s opinion in Momentive,19 which adopted the
chapter 13 prime plus formula rate, and to give that to the secured party as the
present value, reflecting the present value of its claim. So, those are actually
beneficial things that I also think are great ideas.
PROFESSOR HARNER: Well, I want to thank all our panelists. I will tell
you over the past year I have done almost 40 different presentations on the
Commission Report, and I don’t mean this to be derogatory of any of my other
panels, they’re all fantastic, but I think we pulled out concepts and policy
issues that haven’t yet been discussed before, so I appreciate those insights,
and I would encourage you all to read the Report. It’s great bedtime reading.
Put you right—no. There’s a lot of history and case law in the Report, and that
was done intentionally. The ABI is an educational institution. Our mission is to
educate, and we hope that if nothing else, we have a better informed bar,
thinking about ways to use the Code and thinking about ways to make it better.
So, I hope the dialogue about reform continues and I’m happy to talk with
anyone about reform. Just find me at Maryland’s website and shoot me an
email. Thank you again.
19 See No. 14-22503-RDD, 2014 WL 4436335 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 9, 2014), aff’d, 531 B.R. 321
(S.D.N.Y. 2015).
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MS. DEPPERT: And with such a tremendous amount of knowledge and
experience on this stage, I wanted to be able to open the floor for maybe one or
two questions for our panelists if anyone has one.
PROFESSOR JACOBY: We have a couple of professors up here who might
call on someone.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: I enjoyed your comments about reforms of DIP
financing. One of the things you said, this idea that you could have rollups in
particular circumstances including being able to demonstrate that the pricing
was better than anything else available. My experience is that there really is
never competitive DIP bidding, so that I just wonder how often we’re going to
find a better or a comparative offer out there to decide whether this debtor has
met.
PROFESSOR BRUNSTAD: That’s an excellent point. A case of competitive
DIP bidding was of course the Ames case that Judge Bushman took. It’s a very
famous case. It’s wonderful. There, the pre-existing lender, Citibank, offered
40 million in new money, provided you had a roll-up, and of course that’s
typical existing creditor type of response, but because the postpetition facility
was going to be secured, but the nice thing about Ames, which we don’t see too
often was that the existing creditor was unsecured completely, and so you can
have DIP financing shopping because Chemical Bank came in and said, we’ll
give you $250 million, but we’ll do it on a superpriority basis. You don’t have
to give us a lien as long as there are no liens that are allowed, and they beat out
Citibank.
Your comment is great because it underscores, usually the source of
funding is going to be the existing lenders for a lot of reasons. They have
intimate knowledge of the debtor, they have something at stake, they are
invested. And Grant Gilmore had this very famous theory about why we like
security interests. Because the secured party is invested, it’s basically forced to
participate in ways hopefully that will help everybody. But what I see this
proposal as doing is forcing that existing lender to actually fulfill that role, the
Gilmorian role of the good cop on the block who’s going to help police the
process and actually enhance it. You can’t walk away with the goodies; you’ve
got to make a decision based upon your knowledge of whether you’re going to
invest further. And I think that the Code should reward that constructive
behavior and should not reward the opposite where the secured creditor just
sits back, doesn’t contribute anything new but expects all the benefits. So
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actually I think these proposals are wonderful because they help fulfil the
Gilmorian vision of the virtuous secured lender.
MS. DEPPERT: Thank you. Let’s give our corporate panelists one more
round of applause.

